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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Commonwealth of Ravisia and the Republic of Alicanto have
agreed to submit this dispute to the International Court of Justice pursuant
to article 40(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice ('Statute')
and in accordance with the Compromis notified to the Court on 15
September 2006. Pursuant to article 36(1) of the Statute, the Court has
jurisdiction to decide all matters referred to it for decision.
Ravisia and Alicanto have agreed to act consistently with the Court's
decision.
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1.
2.

3.
4.

5.

Whether the presence of Ravisian troops in Alicantan territory is
justifiable under international law.
Whether the Court should call upon Ravisia to produce the intelligence
delivered to the Secretary-General and, if Ravisia continues to
withhold the intelligence, whether Alicanto should be afforded an
evidentiary benefit.
Whether the Secretary-General may lawfully hand over the
intelligence to Alicanto.
Whether Ravisian troops' conduct violated international law, and if so
to whom is their conduct attributable? Additionally, whether Alicanto
is owed reparations for the alleged violations of international law.
Whether Piccardo Donati's sentence is lawful, and if so whether
Ravisia is under an obligation to return Donati to Alicantan authorities.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

Alicanto, a former Ravisian colony, is a member of the Ravisian
Family of Nations ('R-FAN'), a regional cultural and political association.
Culturalandreligious make-up
The Alicantan population is predominantly comprised of Dasu and
Zavaabi, who constitute 95% of the population. About 30% of Alicantans
consider themselves Dasu, about 50% Zavaabi, and 15% 'both'. Both
follow the Talonnic religion and have historically lived harmoniously.
Three distinctions are notable: since Alicantan independence, the Dasu
have occupied most of the mid- to upper-level business and government
positions; the Zavaabi are typically more orthodox in their Talonnic faith;
and the Zavaabi's living-standards are significantly lower.
New Bennu operations in the Rocian Plateau
The Alicantan side of the mountainous Rocian Plateau bordering New
Bennu is largely lawless. Alicantan authorities have repeatedly conceded
inability to control the region. A major NGO study in 2000 concluded that
the Dasu-led authorities were intentionally turning a blind eye, so as not to
provoke the Zavaabi majority.
In early 2005, responding to drug trade and gun violence, New Bennu
authorities adopted a zero-tolerance policy. Smugglers retaliated, killing
many Zavaabi villagers in the crossfire. Leaflets were distributed accusing
the Dasu-led New Bennu government of deliberately targeting innocent
Zavaabis. Tensions prompted many Dasu to flee the Plateau.
In June 2005, New Bennu commenced aerial bombardments against
suspected smuggling enclaves. The campaign killed mostly Zavaabis.
Alicantan Government
In the 2005 Alicantan elections, the Guardians, an orthodox Talonnic
party led by Gregory Simurg, won office with minority party support. In
October, Prime Minister Simurg proclaimed a negotiated cease-fire
agreement with New Bennu.
UNMORPH
On 5 December 2005, in Resolution 5440, the Security Council ('SC'),
responding to requests from Alicanto and New Bennu, determined a threat
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to international peace and security in the region and authorised the UN
Mission Overseeing the Rocian Plateau and Hinterlands ('UNMORPH'). A
status-of-forces agreement ('SOFA') was concluded. Ravisia volunteered
the majority of troops and resources to the mission, stationed at Camp Tara.
Major-General Skylark of the Ravisian Army was appointed Special
UNMORPH
Representative and Force Commander of UNMORPH.
defused the unrest without significant bloodshed.
Broadcasting
Resolution 5440 underlined the need for UNMORPH's national
broadcasting, inter alia, to promote progressive development in Alicanto.
The programming by UNMORPH included educational and cultural
programs from the UN Radio News Service, including rights-based
discussion programs for women and youth.
In response to complaints from orthodox religious leaders in the
Plateau, warnings in Ravisian and local dialects were introduced before
potentially offensive programming.
Sexual misconduct
In October 2007, an NGO reported sexual exploitation by UNMORPH
personnel of children in the Plateau. A UN inquiry concluded that
peacekeepers had engaged in non-violent sexual relations with local girls
while off-duty and outside Camp Tara, often with payment of money or
food.
Draw-down of UNMORPH
On 18 February 2008, Skylark reported that the border area was
essentially peaceful and that Alicanto had established an armed police
presence and a network of trial courts. She advised the UN that, provided
the situation continued improving, it would be possible to withdraw troops
and terminate UNMORPH. The next day, the SC issued a resolution
calling for the draw-down of troops and termination of UNMORPH by 31
July. By the end of March, almost half of UNMORPH's personnel were
withdrawn leaving only Ravisian nationals.
Talonnic censorship
In March, the Guardian-led local government of the Northeast
Province adopted an ordinance implementing Talonnic law which
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prohibited secular broadcasts without prior approval.
The Dasu
Broadcasting Company, which aired programs regardless, was promptly
shut down.
Citing Resolution 5440 and the SOFA, Skylark announced that
UNMORPH broadcasts would continue and did not require prior approval.
Alicantan authorities took no steps to enforce the ordinance against
UNMORPH.
Ethnic tensions
The closure of the Dasu Broadcasting Company caused tensions
between Dasu and Zavaabi groups throughout the Northeast Province.
UNMORPH observers reported that 35 Dasu demonstrators were killed by
armed police.
Simurg announced a radical overhaul of the judicial code to
incorporate Talonnic teachings, prompting large-scale Zavaabi celebrations
as well as renewed ethnic unrest. Sporadic riots and significant violence
nationwide broke out in the coming weeks. On 1 June, martial law was
declared in twelve cities.
Reports of imminent ethnic cleansing
On 22 May, an NGO reported hundreds of violent deaths in the
Province. Dasu, fearing persecution, began fleeing en masse to New
Bennu. By 30 June, Dasu numbers in the Province had fallen by 30%. The
NGO foresaw 'ethnic cleansing on a massive scale'. Alicanto denied this
threat. On 3 July the SC adopted Resolution 6620 which affirmed that there
was a continuing threat to peace and security in Alicanto, and outlined steps
to be taken to respond to it.
Simurg's assassinationand escalatingethnic conflict
Simurg and ten staff were killed on 7 July in an airport bombing
involving the Dasu Integrity Front. Alicantan authorities commenced
searching for the prime suspect, Piccardo Donati. Subsequently, selfproclaimed Zavaabi 'defense cadres' claimed responsibility for burning six
Dasu villages in the Plateau. NGOs reported a sophisticated weapons cache
belonging to radical Zavaabi grouplets. Another NGO reported thousands
of fatalities and that tens of thousands of Dasu from across Alicanto were
fleeing imminent attack.
On 22 July, Ravisia's President announced that Ravisia had 'extremely
reliable intelligence' showing 'a real and present danger of ethnic cleansing
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on a massive scale' in Alicanto. Invoking the responsibility to protect, she
called on the SC to extend the UNMORPH mandate or authorise collective
action by R-FAN.
The highly classified Ravisian intelligence was provided to the
Secretary-General, who committed to not divulge the data and delivered a
report to the SC on 23 July. The report affirmed the reliability of Ravisia's
intelligence and concluded that a campaign of systematic violence against
Dasu civilians was being planned.
OperationProvide Shelter
On 24 July, the SC declined to extend the UNMORPH mandate. The
R-FAN Assembly voted to endorse Ravisian intervention in Alicanto. On 1
August, the day after UNMORPH's termination, Ravisia's Operation
Provide Shelter ('OPS') began. Within the week, Camp Tara housed 6,000
Ravisian troops under Skylark's command.
Although Alicanto's new Prime Minister claimed this was an act of
war, Alicanto did not mount any military operation to remove OPS troops.
OPS troops engaged in an average of three weekly operations, performing
police functions including weapons confiscation and quelling riots.
Alicantan authorities did nothing to prevent OPS troops from intervening.
Alicanto 's new JudicialCode
A new Judicial Code, adopted 15 August 2008, drew criticism from
international human rights organizations. Under the Code, property and
business titles of hundreds of Dasu were forfeited and made available to
Zavaabi citizens, and the death penalty was reinstated for murder.
Donati's conviction andsentence
After announcing that the search for Donati was unsuccessful,
Alicantan authorities began a trial in absentiaunder the new Alicantan law.
NGOs noted reservations about the trial in absentia.
On 1 September, Donati was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death by hanging. An unsuccessful appeal was conducted in absentia.
Under Alicantan law, Donati may be executed without retrial if
apprehended within 12 years.
On 17 September, Skylark announced that Donati had been granted
refuge at Camp Tara. She announced her intention not to deliver him to
Alicanto for execution, refusing to provide further details.
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SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS

DeclarationA
Operation Provide Shelter is lawful for three reasons.
First, Ravisia is exercising its right of humanitarian intervention. This
is a customary exception to the prohibition on the use of force. The
exception can be invoked upon fulfilment of six criteria, all of which
Ravisia has met.
Secondly, and in the alternative, Ravisia has an obligation to prevent
the imminent genocide in Alicanto. This is a peremptory obligation that
arises upon suspicion of a serious risk that genocide will be committed. The
obligation is consistent with article 2(4), and engages Ravisia due to
Ravisia's unique 'capacity of influence' over Alicanto.
Thirdly, the Security Council ('SC') authorised Operation Provide
Shelter ('OPS'). Both resolutions 5440 and 6620 were enacted under
Chapter VII and established a means of restoring peace to Alicanto. OPS
was one such means.
Ravisia's presence in Alicanto is therefore legal.
DeclarationB
The Court should decline to call upon Ravisia to produce its classified
intelligence because it is not necessary to elucidate either matter in issue.
These two matters-the humanitarian emergency and the serious risk of
genocide-are independently established by multiple sources. The
classified intelligence is thus not determinative. If the Court deems this
intelligence necessary, three factors indicate that the Court should decline to
exercise its discretion in the present case.
Alternatively, if Ravisia continues to withhold the intelligence, the
Court should not afford Alicanto any evidentiary benefit by drawing an
adverse inference against Ravisia. The intelligence is privileged for reasons
of national security. Further, in the absence of any contrary evidence
proffered by Alicanto, Ravisia has discharged its burden of proof to a
sufficient standard.
The Secretary-General may not lawfully hand the classified
intelligence over to Alicanto. This is because the Court lacks jurisdiction
for two reasons. First, it cannot determine the obligations of the SecretaryGeneral as the UN is an indispensable third party. Secondly, Alicanto lacks
standing with respect to the merits of its claim. Alternatively, the SecretaryGeneral may not lawfully hand over the classified intelligence to Alicanto
pursuant to a treaty formed between Ravisia and the UN.
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DeclarationC
Ravisia was not bound at international law to respect Alicantan law
prohibiting sexual relations with children under sixteen.
Even if Ravisia was bound at international law to uphold Alicantan
laws, the conduct of its troops was so far removed from their general or
apparent authority that their conduct must be assimilated to them as private
individuals.
Even if the troops' conduct is held to have been within their official
capacity, the conduct of the troops is not attributable to Ravisia, as the UN
exercised overall authority and effective control of their conduct.
Similarly, the broadcasting does not entail Ravisian responsibility.
The broadcasting by Ravisian troops within the UNMORPH force was done
on the specific direction of the SC. After the mandate expired, Ravisia was
not bound by the Alicantan ordinance to cease broadcasting, as the
ordinance was an unlawful restriction of Alicantan citizens' rights to
freedom of expression, which is protected by the ICCPR.
Finally, no alleged injury to Alicanto or its citizens warrants
reparations as Alicanto has not exhausted the local remedies available to it
and, furthermore, the broadcasting has caused no injuries. Finally, and in
the alternative, reparations should be limited to curial declaration.
DeclarationD
Piccardo Donati's execution and trial violate international law.
Alicanto's retroactive imposition of the death penalty violates both articles
6 and 15 of the ICCPR. Alicanto's reintroduction of capital punishment also
violates article 6(2). Donati's trial in absentia was unlawful under article 14
of the ICCPR.
Ravisia cannot return Donati because of its obligations under the
ICCPR. Ravisia's obligations under the ICCPR extend to Donati. Ravisia,
as an abolitionist state, cannot return Donati to Alicanto for execution.
Further, and in the alternative, Ravisia cannot return Donati to be executed
in light of his unlawful trial and sentence.
No other obligations require Ravisia to return Donati. SC resolution
1373 does not oblige Ravisia to return Donati in violation of his ICCPR
rights. Further, Ravisia bears no customary obligation to extradite Donati,
and even if it did, Donati's offence was political, therefore there is no
obligation to extradite him under customary international law.
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PLEADINGS

I. THE PRESENCE OF THE RAVISIAN MILITARY FORCES IN ALICANTO HAS
BEEN AND CONTINUES TO BE FULLY JUSTIFIED UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Until the expiry of the UNMORPH mandate on 31 July 2008, the
presence of Ravisian military forces in Alicanto was justified under
Resolution 5440.' Ravisia's presence in Alicanto after 31 July is justified
for three reasons: first, the humanitarian emergency required intervention;
secondly, Ravisia had an obligation to prevent genocide; and thirdly,
Resolution 6620 authorised Operation Provide Shelter ('OPS').
A. Ravisia's right of humanitarianinterventionjustifies OPS.
1. Humanitarian intervention is an exception to the prohibition on the use
of force.
A right of humanitarian intervention has existed at custom since
Grotius.2 Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations ('Charter'),
interpreted in good faith in its context,3 does not extinguish this right.
The purpose of article 2(4) is to prohibit the use of force and respect
state sovereignty while protecting human rights. Nothing in the Charter
precludes the use of force to achieve these purposes where UN collective
security fails.4 The contemporary doctrine of humanitarian intervention is
an exception to this prohibition, recognised by state practice and opinio
juris.5 It is available where the following conditions are met:

1.

Compromis, Appendix I ('S/Res/5440').

2.
Reisman, 'Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos,' in Lillich (ed) Humanitarian
Intervention andthe United Nations(1973) 167, 179.
3.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155
UNTS 331, (in force 27 January 1980) art 31 (1) ('VCLT').
4.
Military and ParamilitaryActivities in and againstNicaragua (Nicaraguav US) (Merits)
[1986] ICJ Rep 14, 543-4 (Judge Jennings, dissenting) ('Nicaragua');Asrat, Prohibitionof Force under
the UN Charter: A Study of Art.2(4) (1991), 44-5; Cassese, InternationalLaw in a Divided World
(1986), 229; O'Connell, InternationalLaw, (2nd ed, 1986), 319; Schwarzenberger, 'The Fundamental
Principles of International Law' 87 RCADI 1955-1, 338.
5.
VCLT, n3, art 31(3)(b); 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN Doc.A/Res/60/1 (2005), [138]
('2005 Summit Outcome'); UN SCOR, 54th Year, 3988th Meeting, UN Doc.S/PV.3988, (1999), 4(US),
1I(UK), 8 (France), 5(Canada), 8 (Netherlands), 7(Gambia).
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6
a. There is an imminent threat of humanitarianemergency.

Only the Security Council ('SC'), acting under Chapter VII, and
ordering immediate action, may determine that the gravity of an emergency
justifies humanitarian intervention.
The SC made such a determination in respect of Alicanto. Resolutions
5440 and 6620 recognised the continuing 'threat to international peace and
security' and urged Alicanto to take immediate steps to improve the
humanitarian situation.7
8

b. The use offorce is necessary.

The use of force must be the only practicable means to avert the
humanitarian emergency. The affected state must be unable or unwilling to
remedy the situation.
The statements of Alicantan officials, NGOs, Ravisian intelligence,
and the Secretary-General's observations established Alicanto's inability
and unwillingness to fulfil its obligations under Resolution 6620. 9 These
failures precipitated 'a real and present danger' of ethnic cleansing, which
Alicanto refused to acknowledge. 1 ° The use of force, therefore, was the only
means to avert the humanitarian emergency.
c. The SC is unable to take action.]
The inability of the SC to take action to prevent a humanitarian
emergency is established by the exercise or threat of veto power.
Although supported by a majority of members, both Resolutions put
before the SC to intervene on humanitarian grounds in Alicanto were
defeated by exercise of the veto.'2 It, therefore, was unable to take effective
action within Alicanto to prevent the humanitarian emergency.

6.
Greenwood, 'Humanitarian Intervention: the Case of Kosovo' 2002 FinnYblL 141, 171
('Greenwood').
7.

S/Res/5440; Compromis, Appendix II, [1]-[4] ('S/Res/6620')

8.

Greenwood, n6, 171.

9.

Compromis, [31], [33]-[341; Appendix III, [10]-[12].

10.

Compromis, [34], [37], [50].

11.

Greenwood, n6, 171.

12.

Compromis, [39].
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d The intervention is proportionate.

The use of force must be strictly limited in time and scope to the
humanitarian aim. 4 OPS is targeted, and does not breach the territorial
integrity and political independence of Alicanto. 5
16

e. The authorisationconstitutes collective action.

The requirement of collective action is satisfied by the endorsement of
R-FAN, the regional association to which Alicanto belongs.
2. The 'Responsibility to Protect' doctrine does not apply.
The 'Responsibility to Protect' doctrine, which relies on SC
authorisation, does not bind Ravisia for two reasons. First, it has no force in
law. 17 Lacking sufficient state practice, it is merely de lege ferenda,
inapplicable to Alicanto.
Secondly, even if the Court were to accept that the doctrine represents
custom, its operation is premised upon effective performance of the UN
collective security mechanism. It is consistent with the subsisting right of
humanitarian intervention, which operates where this collective security
mechanism fails.
B. Alternatively, OPS isjustifiedby Ravisia 's obligationto prevent
genocide in Alicanto.
1. There is a customary obligation to prevent genocide.
The obligation to prevent genocide, set out in the 1948 Genocide
Convention,i8 has now crystallized as a jus cogens customary norm,
demonstrated by virtually uniform state practice and opinion juris,19 from
which no derogation is permitted.2 °
13.

Greenwood, n6, 171.

14.

UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office note to NATO states, 1998. Greenwood, n6, 158.

15.

Charterof the UnitedNations, art 2(4) ('Charter');Compromis, [41], [45]-[46], [51].

16.

2005 Summit Outcome, n5, [138]-[139].

17.
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to
Protect(2001), [15].
18.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for
signature 9 December 1948, 78 LNTS 26 (in force 12 January 1951) ('Genocide Convention).
19. Application of the Convention on the Prevention andPunishmentof the Crime of Genocide
(Preliminary Objections) [1996] ICJ Rep 595, 615('Bosnian Genocide 1996); Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Requests for Provisional
Measures) [1993] ICJ Rep 235, 439-40('Bosnian Genocide 1993); Application of the Convention on the
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2. The obligation to prevent genocide arose when Ravisia learnt of a
serious risk.
The obligation to prevent genocide is owed erga omnes,2 1 and is not
territorially limited.22 A state's obligation to prevent and the concomitant
duty to act arise at the instant that the state learns of, or should have learned
of, a serious risk of genocide.23 Towards this end, it is sufficient that a state
reasonably suspects persons of harbouring specific intent 'to destroy, in
whole or in part' a particular group.24 Such intent may be demonstrated by a
policy or plan, 25 particular acts, the scale of atrocities, localisation, and the
deliberate and systematic targeting of a particular group.2 6
Immediately prior to OPS, Ravisia could reasonably suspect that the
Zavaabi militants harboured specific intent to destroy 'in whole or in part'
the Dasu people.2 7 Ravisia had convincing evidence that a 'campaign of
systematic violence against Dasu civilians was being planned'. 28 The
violence was escalating, 29 and communications of an 'impending
coordinated attack,' 30 as well as an illegal weapons cache, were
intercepted. 1 The deaths of thousands of Dasu at the hands of militias, 2 the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia) [2007]
Judgment, ICJ General List No.91 Judge Kreca, separate opinion [101] ('Bosnian Genocide 2007');
Schabas, 'Genocide and the International Court of Justice: Finally a Duty to Prevent the Crime of
Crimes' (2007) 2(2) Genocide Studies and Prevention 101, 122; Schabas, Genocide in International
Law (2000) 500-502.
20.
Fragmentation of International Law: Dfficulties Arising from the Diversification and
Expansion ofInternationalLaw, Report of the Study Group of the ILC, UN Doc.A/CN.4/L.682 (2006),
123 ('FragmentationReport').
21.
Bosnian Genocide 1996, n19, 615-616; FragmentationReport, n20, [408]; Reservations to
the Convention on Genocide (Advisory Opinion) [1951] ICJ Rep 15, 23 ('Reservations ); The Crime of
Genocide, GA Res 96, GAOR, 1st Sess, UN Doc.A/96 (1946).
22.
Bosnian Genocide 1996, n19, 616; Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company,
Limited (Judgment) (Belgium v Spain) [19701 ICJ Rep 3, 32 ('BarcelonaTraction'); Bosnian Genocide
2007, n19, [183].
23.
Bosnian Genocide 2007, ni9 155, [431]; Bosnian Genocide 2007, n19 (Judge Keith
declaration) [11].
24.

Bosnian Genocide 2007, n19, [190].

25.
Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, 21 May 1999r, [276];
ProsecutorvJelisic ICTY-95-10-A, Judgment, 5 July 2001, ('Jelisic') [48].
26.

Prosecutorv Akayesu ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment 2 September 1998, [477].

27.

Genocide Convention, n18, art 2.

28.

Appendix III, [10].

29.

Appendix III, [7].

30.

Appendix III, [5].

31.

Compromis, [33].
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targeted burning of Dasu villages, and the displacement of tens of
thousands of Dasu in apprehension of imminent attack,33 raised reasonable
suspicion that the militants either intended to kill members of the Dasu
group, 34 or to inflict 'conditions of life calculated to bring about [their]
physical destruction in whole or in part' .35
As in Bosnian Genocide, Ravisia's duty to prevent has been activated
by the reasonable suspicion of by, risk of genocide, established by
Secretary-General reports, 36 ethnic tension, knowledge of armed forces
present in the region, and the ongoing attention of the UN. 37
3. Use of the term 'ethnic cleansing' does not preclude a finding of
imminent genocide.
The term 'ethnic cleansing' is often used interchangeably with
'genocide'. 3s Moreover, ethnic cleansing per se may constitute genocide
where the necessary specific intent of genocide exists. 39 Further, in dealing
with the obligation to prevent genocide, evidence of a campaign of 'ethnic
cleansing' can indicate a serious risk of escalation to genocide.
4. The obligation to prevent genocide fell upon Ravisia due to its capacity
of influence.
The obligation to prevent genocide requires states to employ 'all
means reasonably available' to prevent genocide. 40 The scope of the
obligation is proportionate to the state's capacity of influence over the
relevant actors, determined by three parameters: (1) geographical
proximity; (2) the strength of political and other links; and (3) the legal
limits prescribed by international law.4'
32.

Compromis, [29].

33.

Compromis, [33].

34.

Genocide Convention, n18, art 2(a).

35.

Genocide Convention, n18, article 2(c).

36.

Bosnian Genocide2007, n19, [436];

37.

Bosnian Genocide 2007, n19, [435]-[438], Compromis, [36]; S/Res/6620; Appendix III,

38.

Prosecutor v Blagojevic IT-02-60-T, Judgment, 17 January 2005, [659]-[666]; The

[2]-[3].
situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, GA Res.47/121, GAOR, 91st plen.mtg., UN Doc.A/Res/47/121

(1992).
39.

Bosnia Genocide 2007, n9, [190]; Jorgic v Germany, no.74613/01, ECHR, 12 July 2007,
B-[113].

40.
41.

Bosnian Genocide 2007, n19, [430].
Bosnian Genocide 2007, nl9, [430].
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The obligation to prevent genocide in Alicanto fell upon Ravisia.
Ravisia is geographically proximate to Alicanto, as Alicantan refugees have
fled to Ravisia.4 2 Ravisia and Alicanto share strong political, colonial,
is thus in a position of
religious, economic, and linguistic links.43 Ravisia
44
state.
other
any
unlike
Alicanto
over
influence
5. Thejus cogens obligation to prevent genocide is not limited by
article 2(4).
The obligation to prevent genocide-by employing 'all means'-and
article 2(4) are bothjus cogens norms. By analogy, the Court should apply
the methods of reconciliation used when other equal-ranking rules of
international law conflict.4 5
The two norms may be interpreted harmoniously so that their conflict
is only apparent, not genuine.4 6 Article 2(4) only prohibits use of force in a
'manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations '.4 The
obligation io prevent genocide is consistent with the Purposes of the UN,
given its object to liberate mankind of the crime.48
Alternatively, the specific and long-standing obligation to prevent
genocide prevails under the principles of lex specialis49 and lex posterior.50
The duty to prevent genocide should also be preferred as an 'absolute'
principle, unlike article 2(4) which permits exceptions in self-defence and
collective security. 5

C. The SC authorisedOPS.
The SC is empowered to authorise states, or groups of states, to use
force 52 First, by invoking Chapter54V11 53 and, secondly, establishing the
means desired to remove that threat.

42.

Compromis, [40].

43.

Compromis, [2]-[4].

44.

Bosnian Genocide 2007, n19, [434].

45.

FragmentationReport, n20, 25.

46.

FragmentationReport, n20, 27.

47.

Charter,n15.

48.

Reservations, n2l, 23.

49.

FragmentationReport, n20, 8.

50.

FragmentationReport, n20, 35-36.

51.

Charter,n15, art 51.

52.

Charter,n15, arts 25, 42, 53.
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SC resolutions must be considered in the context 55 of the SC's
involvement in the matter so as to appreciate 'all circumstances that might
assist in determining the legal consequences of the resolution' .56
Resolutions forming part of a series have 'combined and cumulative effect'
and must be interpreted together.57
1. The SC impliedly authorised the use of force.
Resolutions 5440 and 6620 authorise OPS. Construed together in their
context, the two necessary elements are present. First, both resolutions are
made under Chapter VII. Resolution 5440, expressly 'acting under Chapter
VII', authorises the deployment of UNMORPH. Resolution 6620 references
Resolution 5440, impliedly reviving Ch VII.58 Secondly, both determine a
'threat to international peace and security' invoking article 39. 59 As the
authorisation to use force may be sourced anywhere in Chapter VII, 60 this
provides a legal basis which authorises OPS.
Further, the means of removing this threat is the reminder to 'remain
vigilant and prepared to provide humanitarian assistance'. 6' The ordinary
meaning of this reminder,62 interpreted in good faith,63 authorises member
states to provide humanitarian assistance. Thus the SC, already seized of the
situation under Chapter VII, implicitly authorised OPS.
II. DECLINE To CALL UPON RAVISIA To PRODUCE ITS CLASSIFIED
INTELLIGENCE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, DECLINE To AFFORD ANY
EVIDENTIARY BENEFIT SHOULD RAVISIA CONTINUE To WITHOLD THE
53.
Frowein and Krisch, 'Chapter VII' in Simma, The Charter of the United Nations: A
Commentary (2002) 749, 753 ('Frowein'); Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion)
[1962] ICJ Rep 151, 167 ('Certain Expenses').
54.

Charter, ni5, arts 41-42.

55.

Frowein, n53, 713.

56. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(Advisory Opinion), [ 1971 ] ICJ Rep 16, 53 ( 'Namibia 3.
57.

Namibia, n56, 51.

58.
Letter dated 20 March 2003from the Permanent Representative ofthe UK to the President
of the SC, UN Doc.S/2003/350 (2003).
59. Charter, n15, art 39; Frowein, n53, 753, Zambia, SCOR, 1948th mtg UN Doc.S/Res/393
(1976); Iraq and Kuwait, SCOR 2938th mtg, UN Doc.S/Res/665 (1990); Eritrea and Ethiopia, SCOR
3975th mtg, UN Doc S/Res/1227 (1999).
60.

Certain Expenses, n53, 167.

61.

S/Res/6620, [5].

62.

Howrani andfour others, UNAT Judgment No. 4 [19511.

63.

Frowein, n53, 713.
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INTELLIGENCE, AND DECLARE THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL MAY NOT

LAWFULLY HAND IT OVER To ALICANTO

A. The Court should decline to call upon Ravisia to produce its classified
intelligence.
1. The intelligence is not necessary to elucidate any matter in issue.
The Court has the discretionary power to call upon parties to produce
evidence, when necessary to elucidate a matter in issue. 64 Necessity is
determined by the availability of alternative probative evidence.65
There are two matters in issue. First, whether a situation necessitating
humanitarian intervention existed in Alicanto; 66 and second, whether
67
Ravisia had a reasonable suspicion that a serious risk of genocide existed.
The classified intelligence is not necessary to elucidate either matter for
three reasons.
a. First,multiple sources independently establish the matters in issue.
68

SC decisions, reports from NGOs, 69 statements from UNMOPRH
observers7" and Alicantan law enforcement officials 7' independently
establish the imminent humanitarian emergency and the suspicion of a

serious risk of genocide.
This evidence should be accorded probative value72 because it derives
from official, independent bodies; 73 was not specially prepared for this
case; 74 and emanates from identified, 75 multiple sources, 76 demonstrating

64.
Statute of the International Court of Justice ('Statute'), art 49; International Court of
Justice Rules of Court (1978), as amended on 29 September 2005, art 62(1).
65.

Bosnian Genocide 2007, n19, [206].

66.

See Dec.A(I).

67.

See Dec.A(I1).

68.

S/Res/5440; S/Res/6620.

69.

Compromis, [10], [29], [33], [40].

70.

Compromis, [26], Appendix Il.

71.

Compromis, [10], [17].

72. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v
Uganda) [2005] Judgment, ICJ General List No. 116, [58]-[9], ('Armed Activities').
73.

Bosnian Genocide 2007, n19, [227].

74.

Bosnian Genocide 2007, n19, [213].

75.

Bosnian Genocide 2007, n19, [227].

76.

Oil Platforms (IslamicRepublic ofIran v US) [2003]

ICJ Rep

161, 190.

ILSA Journalof Int 7 & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 16:1

contemporaneous and direct knowledge which has not been challenged by
any impartial person."
b. Secondly, two pieces of alternativeevidence diminish the needfor the
intelligence.
First, the Court accepts factual statements made by the SC, such as its
recognition of the threat to the peace in Alicanto, as authoritative. 8
Secondly, the Court gives significant weight to statements unfavourable to
the person making them. 79 The concession by Alicantan officials that they
are unable to end 'the rampant lawlessness of the region,' and PM Simurg's
request for UNMORPH,8 ° constitute admissions probative of a
humanitarian emergency.
c. Thirdly, the intelligence is not necessary because the SecretaryGeneral'sreport may be used as a substitute.
The Secretary-General's report addresses both matters in issue-the
humanitarian emergency and the reasonable suspicion of a serious risk of
genocide-in two different ways.
First, the report may be used for a second-hand hearsay purpose to
prove the truth of a humanitarian emergency.81 The Court treats hearsay
evidence as admissible 82 and accords authoritative weight to the evidence of
independent bodies,83 including the Secretary-General. 84 The Court,
therefore, should value the Secretary-General's conclusion of a planned
'campaign of systematic violence against [the] Dasu'.8 5
Secondly, even if the Court does not admit the report for its secondhand hearsay purpose, it may still be used for the first-hand hearsay
purpose, of proving that Ravisia had a reasonable suspicion of a serious risk
of genocide.
77.

Armed Activities, n72, [61].

78.

Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied PalestinianTerritory

[2004] ICJ Rep 136, 168-171 ('Israeli Wall'); Armed Activities, n72, [154].
79.

Nicaragua,n4, 41; Armed Activities, n72, [61].

80.

Compromis, [17].

81.

Appendix HI, [10].

82.

Corfu Channel case (UK vAlbania) [1949] ICJ Rep 4, 16-7 ('Corfu').

83.

Charter,n15, arts 34, 50; Corfu, n82, 16.

84.

Bosnian Genocide2007, n19, [228], [436]; Armed Activities, n72, [206]; Israeli Wall, n78,

141; Judge Buergenthal, separate opinion, 240-245; Application for Review ofJudgment No 333 of the
United NationsAdministrative Tribunal(Advisory Opinion) [1987] ICJ 18.
85.

Appendix 111,[10].
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2. Alternatively, the Court should decline to exercise its discretion to call
upon the evidence.
The 'burden of evidence' lies upon the parties before the Court. 6 The
Court is not obliged to engage in additional fact-finding and consistently
declines to call upon classified documents.87 As Judge Mahiou stated in the
Bosnian Genocide 2007 case, 8 to accede to a request by one party, risks:
first creating the impression that the Court is helping, or compensating for,
that party; secondly, infringing upon state sovereignty and 'increasing
distrust' of the Court; and thirdly, an embarrassing refusal by a respondent
state invoking national security. For these three reasons, the Court should
decline to exercise its discretion to call upon the confidential intelligence.
B. In the alternative,the Court should decline to afford Alicanto any
evidentiary benefit should Ravisia continue to withhold the intelligence.
1. The Court should not draw an adverse inference against Ravisia.
The overwhelming practice of the Court is to decline to afford an
evidentiary benefit where the withholding party pleads the privilege of
national security. 89 This reflects three principles: first, that an adverse
inference should only be drawn where the failure to produce documents is
unexplained; 90 secondly, that the primacy of national security must be
respected; 9' and thirdly, there is 92a 'legal presumption.. .of the regularity and
necessity of governmental acts.'
The intelligence relied upon by Ravisia and the Secretary-General is
'highly classified under Ravisian law'. 93 Highly classified documents
86.
Kolb, 'General Principles of Procedural Law' in Zimmerman, Tomuschat and OilersFrahm, The Statute of the InternationalCourtof Justice: A Commentary (2006) 793, 818.
87.
Elaboration ofthe Rules of Court [1936] PCIJ (ser.D) No.2 (3d add), 768-9 ('Elaboration
of the Rules'); Diversion of Waters from the Meuse Case, Fourteenth Annual Report, PCIJ, (ser.E)
No.14, 149 ('Meuse'); US Diplomatic and ConsularStaff in Tehran (US v Islamic Republic of Iran)
(ProvisionalMeasures) [1979] ICJ Pleadings 7, 117 ("Tehran Hostages Pleadings'); Bosnian Genocide
2007, n 19, [206].
88.

Bosnian Genocide 2007, n19, Judge Mahiou, dissenting, [58].

Corfu, n82, 32; Meuse, n87, 14; Tehran Hostages Pleadings, n87, 117; Elaborationof the
89.
Rules, n87, 768-9.
Ultrasystems Incorporatedand Islamic Republic ofIran, (1983) 2 fran-US CTR 114, 115
90.
Richard Mosk, concurring.
91.

Rosenne, Essay on InternationalLaw and Practice(2005) 569, 574.

92.
Corfu, n82, Judge Ecer, dissenting, 119-120; Valentiner Case (1903)
Arbitrations 564.
93.

Appendix III, [10]; Compromis, [35], [55].

Venezualan

ILSA Journalof Int l & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 16:1

constitute official secrets, recognised as privileged. 94 Intelligence gathering
95
has never been condemned by the Court despite opportunity to do so.
Accordingly, the court should refrain from drawing any adverse inference
against Ravisia.
2. Ravisia may discharge its burden of proof with a prima facie case.
Ravisia may discharge its burden of proof with a primafacie case for
two reasons.
First, applying a general principle of international courts and
tribunals,96 the Court must take Ravisia's evidence as sufficient to maintain
its propositions, because Alicanto has not rebutted the evidence, if untrue,
by submitting even 'a scintilla of evidence' 97 about the conditions within its
own borders during UNMORPH or OPS.
Secondly, where proof of a fact presents extreme difficulty, a tribunal
may be satisfied with less conclusive proof, that is, primafacie evidence.98
The right of humanitarian intervention and the duty to prevent genocide
rely, in part, upon assessing the intentions of perpetrators. Although these
intentions may be inferred from various acts, 99 by their nature they are
difficult to prove and thus the Court should be satisfied with the proof
provided by Ravisia, even if not conclusive.

C. The Secretary-Generalmay not lawfully hand the classified intelligence
over to Alicanto.
1. The Court lacks jurisdiction to determine the obligations of the Secretary
General as the UN constitutes an indispensable third party.
Where the subject matter of a dispute involves the rights and
obligations of a third party, the Court must decline to exercise its

94.

Elaboration ofthe Rules, n87, 768-9.

95.
US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (USA v Islamic Republic ofIran) [1980] ICJ
Rep 3, 38; Nicaragua, n4, 123, 136-40.
96.
Asylum Case (Columbia v Peru) [1950] ICJ Rep 226, 326-7, Judge Read, dissenting
('Asylum'); De Lemos Case (UK v Venezuela), 1903, Ralston's Rep (1904) 3019, 3021; Brun Case
(France v Venezuela), French-Venezuelan Mixed-Claims Commission, 1902, Ralston's Rep (1906) 5,
225; Janin v Etat Allemand (Franco-German Mixed Tribunal) I Recueil des Decisions 774 (1922); Kling
Case (1930), Mexico-US General Claims Commission 1923, Opinions ofCommission 1929, 36, 49.
97.

Asylum, n96, 326-7, Judge Read, dissenting.

98.
Coru, n82, 18; Lynch Case (1929), British-Mexican Claims Commission 1926, Decisions
& Opinions of Commission, 20, 21.
99.

Jelisic, n25, [48].
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jurisdiction.'00 This principle extends to organisations with international
legal personality,' 0 ' such as the UN' 0 2 Alternatively, if this principle does
not extend to international organisations generally, it does extend to the UN
specifically which has a unique means of consenting to the Court's
jurisdiction, by requesting an advisory opinion. 0 3 To allow states to
unilaterally obtain a ruling upon the legal rights and obligations of the UN
would undermine the specific controls and limits implied in the advisory
opinion mechanism.'04
Determining the legal rights and obligations of the UN would form the
'very subject-matter' of the instant decision. 0 5 It is a pre-requisite.10 6 The
Court must decline jurisdiction.
2. Alternatively, Alicanto lacks standing with respect to the merits of
their claim
Alicanto lacks a sufficient'0 7 legal right or interest to have standing as
a claimant. 0 8 Alicanto has no direct legal interest in the rights and
obligations of the Secretary-General. Similar to the South West Africa case,
the true object of the Applicant's claim is merely to obtain a declaratory
judgement to bring it to the attention of the 'appropriate political organs.'
This constitutes an advisory opinion, which cannot be obtained by states.' 0 9

100. Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v France,UK and US) [1954] ICJ Rep
19, 32 ('Monetary Gold').
101. Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v Portugal) (PreliminaryObjections), 'Preliminary
Objections of the Portuguese Republic' [2004] ICJ Written Pleadings, 43-44; Legality of Use of Force
(Yugoslavia v Portugal)(Verbatim Records), 22 April 2004, ICJ Court Records 2004/18 12-14; Legality
of Use ofForce (Yugoslavia v France)(PreliminaryObjections), 'Preliminary Objections of the French
Republic' [2004] ICJ Written Pleadings, 38; Legality of Use ofForce (Yugoslavia v Italy) (Preliminary
Objections), 'Preliminary Objections of the Italian Republic' [2004] ICJ Written Pleadings, 51.
102. ReparationsforInjuries Suffered in the Service ofthe UnitedNations (Advisory Opinion)
[1949] ICJ Rep 174, 179 ('Reparations').
103.

Charter,n15, art 96.

104.

Statute, n64, 65-8.

105.

Monetary Gold, n100, 32.

106.

CertainPhosphateLands in Nauru (PreliminaryObjections) [1992] ICJ Rep 240, 261-2.

107. Barcelona Traction, n22, 36; South West Africa (Ethiopia v South Africa; Liberia v South
Africa) (SecondPhase) [ 1966] ICJ Rep 6, 22, 32-34 ('South West Africa').
108.

South West Africa, n107, 32-34.

109.

South West Africa, n107, 33.
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3. If the Court does hold that the Applicant has standing, the SecretaryGeneral may not lawfully hand over the intelligence to Alicanto pursuant to
a treaty between Ravisia and the UN.
The UN, as an international legal person, may conclude treaties." 0 A
treaty may be oral"'. and informal in nature.1 12 It will be binding where the
consent of the organisation has been expressed in accordance with its
internal rules. 13 However, where consent is expressed in contravention of
these rules, the treaty will not be invalidated unless the violation was
manifest and concerned a rule of fundamental importance."14
The Secretary-General had competence to bind the UN in a
confidentiality agreement. 15 This competence derives from three sources.
First, the Secretary-General may deal in confidence with member
states on behalf of the UN. 116 This is implied from his 'good offices' role
pursuant to his functions under article 99.117
Secondly, the SC has authorised the 118Secretary-General to keep it
closely informed of the situation in Alicanto.
Thirdly, where the power to conclude a specific form of treaty is not
vested either expressly or impliedly in any other organ, the SecretaryGeneral retains the residual authority to conclude such agreements." 9 The
power to receive confidential information is not expressly or impliedly
vested in any other organ.
Alternatively, if the Secretary-General has expressed the consent of the
UN in violation of its internal rules regarding competence, the violation is
not sufficiently manifest as to extinguish the Secretary-General's ostensible
110.

Reparations, n102, 179.

111.

Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, [19331 PCIJ (Ser.A/B) No.53, 22, 71 ('Eastern

Greenland').
112.

Karunatilleke, 'Essai d'une classification des accords conclus par les Organisations

internationales entre elles ou avec des Etats', (1971) 75 RGIP 17, 36.
113.

Vienna Convention on

the Law of Treaties between States and International

Organisations, opened for signature 21 March 1986, (1986) 25 ILM 543, art 7 (not in force)

('VCL TSIO ).
114.

VCLTSlO, nI13, art46.

115.

Compromis, [38].

116.

United Nations Preparatory Commission, PC/20 (23 December 1945) s2B, [16], [19].

117.

Reparations, n102, 182; Murty, InternationalLaw of Diplomacy (1989) 158; Competence

of the InternationalLabour Organisationto regulate incidentally the personal work of the employer
(Advisory Opinion) [1926] PCIJ (ser.B) No.13, 18.
118.

S/Res/5440, [7]; S/Res/6620, [6].

119. Fitzmaurice, 'The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice,' (1952) 29
BYbIL 1, 13.
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competence and would not be evident to another party acting in good
faith. 20 No clear or explicit provision of the Charter excludes the
competence of the Secretary-General.12 ' The Court has been unwilling to
look beyond the ostensible authority of an agent where the subject matter
has been within their apparent 'province'. 122

III. FIND THAT THE CONDUCT OF RAVISIAN TROOPS WHILST STATIONED
AT CAMP TARA DID NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THAT, IN
ANY EVENT, RAVISIA BEARS No LIABILITY FOR ANY WRONGDOING THAT
MAY HAVE BEEN COMMITTED IN THE SERVICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
AND THAT No ALLEGED INJURY To ALICANTO OR ITS CITIZENS
WARRANTS REPARATIONS

Alicantan laws prohibiting sex with minors or requiring broadcasting
licenses cannot bind Ravisia at international law. Neither the status-offorces agreement ('SOFA') nor Resolution 5440 make these domestic
obligations international. Furthermore, the broadcasting ordinance cannot
bind Ravisia because it violates international human rights law.
Alternatively, any unlawful conduct by the troops cannot be attributable to
Ravisia, since the conduct comprised private-not official-acts, or
because the troops were under the overall authority or effective control of
the UN. Since there is neither breach nor attribution, Ravisia cannot owe
any reparations.
A. Ravisia is not responsiblefor the sexual exploitation.
1. Ravisia is a third party to the SOFA and is not bound by it.
Any obligation to respect local law contained in the SOFA 123 does not
bind Ravisia. The SOFA was concluded between Alicanto and the
Secretary-General. As a third party,
Ravisia cannot bear obligations under
24
the SOFA absent written consent.

120. 'Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its thirty-fourth session'
(1982) YbILC, vo 11(2), 52, UN Doc.A/CN.4/SER.A/1982/Add. 1(Part 2).
121.

Attorney-Generalof Israel vKamiar (1968)44 ILR 197, 268.

122.

Eastern Greenland,n1I I, 71.

123.

Model status-of-forces agreement, UN Doc.A/45/594 (1990), Annex, [6] ('SOFA').

124.

VCLT, n3, art 35.
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2. Resolution 5440 does not extend the SOFA to Ravisia.
While member states are obliged to accept and carry out decisions of
the SC, 125 the direction to conclude the SOFA is addressed only to the UN
and Alicanto. 126 Nothing in the Resolution directs Ravisia to be bound by
the SOFA.
3. Since troops were acting in their private capacity, their conduct is not
attributable to Ravisia.
The ordinary rule of attribution is that the acts of state organs, such as
members of armed forces, are attributable to the state.127 However, where
an organ acts ultra vires, its conduct will only be attributable to a28state if it
occurred within the general scope of actual or apparent authority. 1
UNMORPH troops were deployed pursuant to a limited peace-keeping
mandate. 129 The troops' sexual misconduct occurred while they were offduty, 130 and was so far beyond the scope of their official functions and
authority that these acts must be assimilated to that of private individuals.
131 Their conduct cannot be attributed to Ravisia.
4. Alternatively, even if the exploitation was within the troops' official
capacity, attribution flows to the UN, not Ravisia.
On either a test of 'overall authority', or 'effective control', the
conduct of UNMORPH troops is attributable to the UN.
Overall authority: The conduct of troops forming part of a SCauthorised operation is attributable to the UN where the SC exercises
overall authority over that operation.' 2 The SC tasked UNMORPH's
133
Commander with ensuring that the peacekeepers observed local law.

125.

Charter, n15, art 25.

126.

S/Res/5440, [5].

127. Commentaries to the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, Report of the ILC, Fifty-Third Session, UN GAOR, 56th sess, Supp. No.10, UN
Doc.A/56/10(2001), art 4 ('ASR ).
128.

Caire (Francev Mexico) (1929) 5 RLAA 516.

129.

S/Res/5440, [4].

130.

Compromis, [21].

131.

ASR, n127, art 4.

132. Behrami and Behrami v France; Saramati v France, Germany and Norway (2007) 45
EHRR 10 [134] ('Behrami').
133.

SOFA, n123, [6].
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Furthermore, the Commander reported on developments in the Rocian
Plateau to the SC, 13 4 demonstrating the SC's overall authority.
Effective control: Alternatively, the conduct of a state organ placed at
the disposal of an international organisation is attributable to that
135
control over [that] conduct."
organisation if it 'exercises effective
136
Effective control is a question of fact.
Applying this test, attribution flows to the UN. The UN defined the
peacekeepers' mandate, determined its facilities, 37 and controlled the size
of the force. 138 In contrast to Al-Jedda, where the multinational military
operation was established at the behest of states, 139 UNMORPH was created
by the UN. After the sexual exploitation was reported, it was the UN, not
Ravisia, which investigated the misconduct, demonstrating its capacity to
act to control the force. 140 Therefore the UN, and not Ravisia, exercised
effective control over the conduct of UNMORPH troops.
B. The broadcastingdoes not entail Ravisian responsibility.
1. Ravisia is not obliged to obey the broadcasting ordinance.
As established above, Ravisia has no international obligation to
observe local law. In any event, there was no ordinance prohibiting
unauthorised broadcasting until March 2008.
2. Alternatively, Resolution 5440 authorised the broadcasting.
141
Resolution 5440 'underlines the need' to make secular broadcasts.
This SC decision constitutes sufficient authority
for the broadcasts and
42
overrides any other inconsistent obligations.

134.

Compromis, [23].

135. Responsibility of InternationalOrganizations,Report of the ILC, Fifty-Sixth Session, UN
GAOR, 59th sess, Supp. No.10, UN Doc.A/59/10, 109(2004), art 5 ('DARIO'); Gaja, Second Report on
Responsibility of InternationalOrganizations,UN Doc.A/CN.4/541(2004), [41] ('Gaja').
136.

Gaja, n135, [41].

137.

S/Res/5440, [1], [6].

138.

S/Res/5440, [3]; Compromis,[24].

139.

R (Al-Jedda) v Secretaryof Statefor Defence [2008] 1 AC 332, [24].

140.

Compromis, [17].

141.

S/Res/5440, [6].

142.

Charter,n15, arts 25, 103; FragmentationReport, n20, 169.
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3. In the further alternative, even if Ravisia is bound to obey Alicantan law,
it is not bound by the broadcasting ordinance because it breaches the right
to receive information.
Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
('ICCPR'), 143 Alicanto must ensure Alicantan citizens' right to freely
receive information of all kinds.' 44 Any restrictions on this right must be
provided
for by law, and be necessary to achieve the purposes in article
45
19(3).

a. The restrictionon the right is not 'providedby law'.
Restrictions must be established by an act of nationalparliament or be
a norm of the common law. 146 The local government ordinance falls below
this standard.
b. The restrictionis not necessaryfor any article 19(3) purpose.
Restrictions will only be lawful if they are necessary for the respect of
47
the rights of others, or for the protection of public order or public morals.1
The ordinance is not necessary for any of these purposes.
Respect of rights: The broadcasts are accompanied by culturallysensitive warnings and are in no way coercive. Accordingly, the ordinance
is not necessary to respect the right to freedom from coercion as to religious
belief, 148 or the freedom of parents to direct their children's religious
education. 149 To the contrary, the ordinance disproportionately favours
Talonnic broadcasting, violating parents' religious choice.
Public order: Public order refers to the effective functioning of
society, 5 ° and includes prohibitions on free expression that incite crime or
endanger safety.' 51.The blanket restriction on all secular programming is not

143.

InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, opened for signature 16 December

1966, 999 UNTS 171 (in force 23 March 1976), art 19(3) ('ICCPR3.
144.

ICCPR,n143, art 19(2); Gauthierv Canada,UN Doe CCPR/C/65/D/633/95 (1999).

145.

ICCPR,n143, art 19(3).

146.

Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation of Provisionsin the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Annex, UN Doc E/CN.4/1984/4 (1984), [15] ('Siracusa
Principles');Faurissonv France,UN Doc.CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993(1996).
147.

ICCPR, n143, art 19(3).

148.

ICCPR, n143, art 18(2).

149.

ICCPR, n143, art 18(4).

150. Siracusa Principles,n146, [5].
151.

Baban v Australia,UN Doc.CCPR/C/78/D/1014/2001 (2003).
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sufficiently focused on content likely to disrupt society to be necessary.
Moreover, applying the law has led 1to2 a riot and fatalities, indicating that it
is counterproductive to public order.
Public morals: The "public morality" of Alicanto is difficult to define
54
15 3
due to the varying levels of orthodoxy amongst the Dasu and Zavaabi.1
In this context, no government can define with certainty what constitutes
the public morality of Alicanto. The provincial government is not qualified
to adjudicate on
national morality, especially since it reflects only one
55
denomination.'
4. In the further alternative, the broadcasting is not attributable to Ravisia
because the UN authorised it.
Even if the broadcasting was unlawful, it is not attributable to Ravisia.
The UN exercised both overall authority1 56 and effective control 157 over the
broadcasting. The broadcasts occur at the UN's directive' 5 8 and their
content is drawn from the UN Radio News Service) 59 The radio
transmissions are attributable to the UN, not Ravisia.
5. In addition, the broadcasting by OPS does not breach international law.
Any alleged Ravisian obligation to obey Alicantan law under the
SOFA would lapse on the termination of UNMORPH. From 1 August, the
OPS broadcasts do not entail international responsibility.
C. Ravisia did not owe extraterritorialhuman rights obligations with
regardto sexual exploitation.
States have international human rights law obligations to protect
children from sexual exploitation,1 60 however, they only extend to children
within the state's jurisdiction.'16 Jurisdiction is preponderantly territorial,
152.

Compromis, [25].

153.

Compromis, [6].

154.

Compromis, [5].

155.

Hertzberg v Finland,(61/1979) UN Doc.CCPR/C/15/D (1982), [10.3].

156.

Behrami, n132, [134].

157.

DARIO, n135, art 5.

158.

S/Res/5440, [6].

159.

Compromis, [20].

160. ICCPR, n143, art 24(1); Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20
November 1989,1577 UNTS 3 (in force 2 September 1990), art 34 ('CRC 3.
161.

ICCPR, n143, art 2(1); CRC, n160, art 2(1).
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but may be exercised extraterritorially through effective control over
foreign territory or authority over individuals.' 62
First effective extraterritorial control by Ravisia is not established.
This Court has found effective extraterritorial control only in situations of
military occupation. 163 The finding of control in the case of 30,000 Turkish
troops in Northern Cyprus can also be distinguished' 64 - fewer than 2,000
peacekeepers were in Alicanto, with Alicantan consent and a strictly limited
mandate.1 65 Moreover, Alicanto maintains public powers in the
region,
66
terminating unlawful broadcasting and implementing martial law. 1
Secondly, Ravisia does not have jurisdiction through authority over
individuals in Alicanto. Non-violent sexual offences are distinguishable
from the coercive use of state power, such as arrest, 167 detention168 or
military force, which establishes this type of jurisdiction. 169 Incidental
encounters and transitory presence are insufficient. 7 0
D. Further,no alleged injury to Alicanto or its citizens warrants
reparations.
Ravisia is not liable for reparations absent any international wrong.
Even if Ravisia had acted unlawfully, no reparations are warranted because
first, Alicanto lacks standing and secondly, the broadcasting caused no
damage.
1. Local remedies have not been exhausted.
For a state to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of injured
nationals, local remedies must first be exhausted. 171 This will occur when

162. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No.31: Nature of the General Legal
ObligationImposed on States Partiesto the Covenant, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13(2004), [10].
163.
164.
[76]-[77].

Israeli Wall, n78, 180-181; Armed Activities, n72, [216].
Loizidou v Turkey (Merits) (1996) 23 EHRR 513; Cyprus v Turkey, (2002) 35 EHRR 30,

165.

S/Res/5440, [3]-[4].

166.

Compromis, [25], [29].

167.

dcalan v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 45, [91].

168.

Coardv US(1999) IACHRNo.109/99, [37].

169.

Alejandre v Cuba (1999) 1ACHR No.86/99, [25].

170.

R (A1-Skeini) v Secretary of State for Defence (Redress Trust Intervening) [2008] 1 AC

171.

Interhandel(Switzerlandv. US) (PreliminaryObjections) [ 1959] ICJ Rep 6, 27.

153.
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the claim has been
pursued as far as possible before the competent tribunals
172
without success.
To settle disputes between Alicanto and peacekeepers, two competent
1 73
tribunals are available: the standing claims commission under the SOFA,
or the local claims review boards administered by the UN, typically utilised
by host states. 174 These claims boards distribute compensation to persons
injured during a UN peacekeeping operation, and then recover the sum from
any responsible troop-contributing country. 175 Given the victims' failure to
pursue a claim locally, Alicanto lacks standing to pursue a claim of
diplomatic protection. 176
2. The broadcasting has caused no injury.
In the context of widespread crime on the Rocian Plateau and
abdication of Alicantan law enforcement, 177 damage to social fabric is too
remote 178 to be causally linked to the broadcasting.
Furthermore, the broadcasts encouraged the progressive development
of Alicantan communities,
giving them access to information on
79
fundamental rights. 1
3. Alternatively, reparations must be reduced or withheld because of
contributory negligence.
Alicanto took no steps to enforce the ordinance. 80 This failure to
mitigate the alleged damage means that reparations should be reduced or
withheld because of contributory
negligence. 18 ' Alicanto cannot claim for
82
1
avoidable.
was
damage that
172. Elletronica Sicula SpA (US v Italy) [1989] ICJ Rep 15, [59]; Mavrommatis Palestine
Concessions (Greece v UK) [1924] PCU (ser A) No.2, 12.
173.

SOFA, n123, [51].

174. Financingof the United Nations Protection Force, Report of the Secretary-General, UN
Doc.A/51/389(1996), 7.
175. Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Report of the SecretaryGeneral, UN Doc.A/51/903(1997), 5.
176. Amrallah, 'The International Responsibility of the UN for the Activities Carried out by
UN Peacekeeping Forces' (1976) 32 Revue Egyptienne de Droit International57, 76.
177.

Compromis, [11], [29], [45].

178.

ASR, n127,93.

179.

S/Res/5440, [5].

180.

Compromis, [25].

181.

ASR, n127, art 39.

182.

Gabcikovo-NagymarosProject (Hungary/Slovakia)[1997] ICJ Rep 7, 55.
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4. In the further alternative, reparation should be limited to curial
declaration.
Restitution and compensation are not possible as the damage cannot be
undone 83 and moral affront to a state is not compensable.' 84 85Curial
declaration is a significant sanction and should suffice as reparation.'
IV. THE ALICANTAN CITIzEN PICCARDO DONATI NEED NOT BE HANDED
OVER To ALICANTO, WHERE HE WILL BE SUBJECTED To JUDICIAL
EXECUTION IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

The application of capital punishment for Donati's offences is contrary
to international law because, first, Alicanto cannot retroactively apply the
heavier penalty of death, secondly, Alicanto cannot reintroduce capital
punishment, and thirdly, Donati's trial in absentia was contrary to his fair
trial rights. On any of these bases, Ravisia need not return Donati, and there
is no alternative obligation under the SC Resolution 1373 or in the
customary law of extradition.
A. Donati'sexecution and trialare contrary to internationallaw.
1. Alicanto's retroactive imposition of the death penalty violates article 6
of the ICCPR.
Article 6(2) of the ICCPR states that 'sentence of death may be
imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in
force at the time of the commission of the crime',186 which permits no
exceptions for retroactive application. 187 Donati's offence occurred on 7
July 2008.188 Alicanto violated article 6(2) by reintroducing capital
punishment on 15 August,' 89 and retroactively applying it to Donati.

183.

ASR, n127, art35.

184.

ASR,n127,99.

185. Difference Between New Zealand and France Concerning the Interpretation or
Application of Two Agreements, Concluded on 9 July 1986 Between the Two States and which Related
to the Problems Arisingfrom the Rainbow Warrior Affair (1990) 20 UNR1AA 217, 273.

186. ICCPR, n143, art 6(2) [emphasis added].
187. ICCPR, n143, art 6(2).
188.

Compromis, [32].

189.

Compromis, [44].
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2. Alicanto's retroactive imposition of the death penalty is also in violation
of article 15.
Article 15(1) of the ICCPR states, 'a heavier penalty [shall not] be
imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal
offence was committed.'1 90 Donati's execution violates this article, as
capital punishment - the ultimate punishment - is a heavier penalty than the
penalty existing at the time of his offence.
An exception to article 15(1) exists if the retroactive sentence is
pursuant to an offence which at the time was criminal under customary
international law. 191 Alicanto may seek to interpret Donati's crimes as
terrorism and thereby avail themselves of this exception. This fails in fact
and law, because Donati was not convicted of terrorism, 192 and terrorism
does not exist as a crime under customary international law. 193 Treaties for
the suppression of terrorism, which Ravisia and Alicanto are not a party to,
do not codify or crystallise terrorism as a customary international law
crime. 94 Instead, states have been unable to agree upon a sufficiently clear
definition of terrorism at customary international law. 95
3. Alicanto's reintroduction of capital punishment violates article 6(2) of
the ICCPR.
Alicanto's reintroduction of capital punishment on 15 August 2008
after its abolition in 1982 was unlawful. 96 Article 6(2) of the ICCPR,
197
interpreted in its ordinary meaning and in light of its object and purpose,
impliedly prohibits the reintroduction of capital punishment. Article 6(2)
states, '[i]n countries which have not abolished"the death penalty, sentence
of death may be imposed...'.198 The ordinary meaning of these words

190.

ICCPR, n143, art 15(1).

191.

ICCPR, n143, art 15(2).

192.

Compromis, [48].

193. Higgins, 'The general international law of terrorism' in Higgins and Flory (eds), Terrorism
andInternationalLaw (1997) 13 13-28, ('Higgins').
194. InternationalConventionfor the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, opened for signature
15 December 1997, 2149 UNTS 256, (in force 23 May 2001); International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financingof Terrorism, opened for signature 9 December 1999, (2000) 39 ILM 270
(in force 10 April 2002); InternationalConventionfor the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,
opened for signature 14 September 2005, (2005) 44 ILM 825, (in force 7 July 2007).
195.
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demonstrates that the right of judicial execution only applies for states that
have not abolished the death penalty. Accordingly, once abolished their
right expires.
The object and purpose of article 6 is the abolition of capital
punishment as evidenced by article 6(6) which states, '[n]othing in this
article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition of capital
punishment by any State Party to the present ICCPR." 99 Further, the
travauxpr~paratoiresconfirm200 that the purpose and object of article 6 is
to promote and pursue the abolition of capital punishment and that the
exception within article 6(2) merely acknowledges that capital punishment
existed in some states at the time of drafting. 20 1 The implied prohibition on
the reintroduction has also been accepted by several Members of the HRC,
the authentic interpreter of the ICCPR.2 °2 Therefore, Alicanto intention to
execute Donati is in breach of the ICCPR.
4. Donati's trial in absentia was unlawful under article 14 of the ICCPR.
Article 14(3)(d) provides for the right of an accused to be tried in their
presence in the determination of any criminal charge against them.20 3 For a
trial in absentia to be lawful the accused must be duly notified of the date
and place of their trial and their presence requested.20 4 It cannot be
20 5
assumed that the accused was informed of the proceedings against them.
Only subsequent entitlement to a retrial can remedy this breach.20 6
Alicanto failed to notify Donati of any of the details of the proceedings
against him. Donati's knowledge of these proceedings cannot be presumed.
As Donati's trial in absentia was unlawful other rights dependent upon
Donati's presence have by necessary intendment been violated. These
include Donati's right to be informed of the charge, 207 prepare the

199.
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defence, 20 8 select counsel 2°9 and examine witnesses 2 '.
Finally, since
Donati is not entitled to a retrial within twelve years of his sentence being
pronounced, the breach cannot be remedied. 1 1
5. The prohibition on trial in absentia is non-derogable as it was a death
penalty case.
Article 6 is non-derogable.2 12 Article 6(2) states that the death penalty
21 3
cannot be imposed 'contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant'.
Actions contrary to article 14, from which states can otherwise derogate,21 4
are therefore rendered non-derogable in capital punishment cases. 215
Therefore, Alicanto could not derogate from article 14.
6. Further and in the alternative, if derogation was possible it was not
permissible in these circumstances.
Derogation under article 4 in the case of a public emergency
threatening the life of the nation requires, first an official proclamation of
that emergency, and secondly, that the derogation be limited to the extent
strictly required.2 16
a. There was no official proclamationof a public emergency.
The requirement of an official proclamation is a condition sine qua
non. A detailed declaration by the relevant minister of the existence of a
public emergency and the government's intention to derogate has been held
to be sufficient.2 18
Alicanto could not have lawfully derogated from the prohibition on
trial in absentia as Alicanto never declared the existence of a public
emergency nor its intention to derogate from the ICCPR.
2 17
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b. The derogation was not to the extent strictly required.
A state can only derogate to the extent required by the exigencies of
the public emergency. 2 19 Alicanto has denied Donati the right to be tried in
person for both his original hearing and appeal, and for any future appeal
since, even if he comes within Alicantan custody within the next twelve
years, he has no right to a retrial. Such a significant curtailment of
fundamental fair trial rights for a merely symbolic conviction is not strictly
required in the circumstances.
B. Ravisia cannot return Donati because of its obligations under the
ICCPR.
1. Ravisia's obligations under the ICCPR extend to Donati.
The ICCPR applies to all exercises of state jurisdiction. This Court has
approved the decision in Lopez22 0 which considered that extraterritorial
arrest and detention is sufficient for state jurisdiction. 221 By analogy to
Lopez, although Ravisia does not exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction
outside Camp Tara, Ravisia's custody of Donati in a military brig is
sufficient to extend the ICCPR to Donati.2 22
2. Ravisia, an abolitionist state, cannot return Donati to Alicanto to
be executed.
It has been established in Judge that a state which has abolished capital
punishment cannot deport a person to another state where they will be
executed.223 The exception in article 6(2) which permits execution applies
only to countries which have not abolished the death penalty. Ravisia,
having abolished capital punishment in 1947 is therefore bound under
article 6(1) to protect the inherent right to life of all persons within its
jurisdiction, and cannot return Donati for execution.
3. Further and in the alternative, Ravisia cannot return Donati to be
executed in light of his unlawful trial and sentence.
A state party to the ICCPR cannot extradite a person within its
jurisdiction where there is a real risk that that person's rights under the
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ICCPR will be violated in another jurisdiction.224 As previously established,
Donati's rights have been violated by Alicanto's reinstatement and
retroactive application of capital punishment and his trial in absentia.
Ravisia cannot return Donati to face unlawful execution in Alicanto.
C. No other obligations requireRavisia to return Donati.
1. SC Resolution 1373 does not oblige Ravisia to return Donati.
Alicanto may seek to argue that SC Resolution 1373 obliges Ravisia to
return Donati. Resolution 1373 requires states to '[d]eny safe haven to those
who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts'. 225 However,
Resolution 1373 does not oblige Ravisia to return Donati because, first,
Resolution 1373 does apply to Donati, and secondly, it does not negate
Ravisia's human rights obligations.
a. Resolution 1373 does not apply to Donati.
Resolution 1373 does not define 'terrorist acts'. In the absence of a
definition, Resolution 1373 can only refer to acts that treaty or customary
international law class as 'terrorism'. As established above, Donati's
offence is not 'terrorism' under customary international law and neither
Ravisia nor Alicanto are parties to any treaty for its suppression. Ravisia
therefore is not obliged by Resolution 1373 to return Donati.
b. Furtherand in the alternative,Resolution 1373 does not negate
Ravisia's human rights obligations under the ICCPR.
Nothing in Resolution 1373 would require Ravisia to return Donati to
Alicanto, in breach of its obligations under the ICCPR. The presumption
when interpreting Resolution 1373 is that the SC did not intend to act
contrary to the UN's purposes and principles, one of which is to achieve
cooperation in promoting respect for human rights.226 This is confirmed by
Resolutions 1456227 and 1624, 228 which reference and reaffirm Resolution
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1373 and stress that states must uphold their human rights obligations when
complying with Resolution 1373.
Therefore, Ravisia in light of its obligations under the ICCPR is not
obliged by Resolution 1373 to return Donati.
2. Ravisia bears no customary obligation to extradite Donati.
There is no obligation at customary international law for a state to
extradite or prosecute an offender within its jurisdiction.229
In the absence of an extradition treaty between Ravisia and Alicanto
there is no customary obligation for Ravisia to return Donati for execution.
3. Further and in the alternative, as Donati's offence was political there is
no obligation to extradite him under customary international law.
If the Court accepts that there is a customary obligation to extradite,
then that obligation does not apply where the crimes concerned were
'incidental to and formed part of political disturbances'. 230 An offence is
'political' if a close nexus exists between the violence and the political
object of forcing a regime to resign or change its policies. 23' However, the
political motive becomes irrelevant where it is likely to involve killing or
232
injuring members of the public.
Donati's attack on PM Simurg was political. As the leader of the Dasu
Integrity Front,233 Donati was reported to have planned a 'dramatic
demonstration of Dasu solidarity'.234 In attacking the head of state, the
putative objective was to change the Guardian Government or its policies.
Moreover, the attack was directed at or likely to kill members of the public
as it was specifically targeted and the casualties were limited to Simurg and
his entourage.235
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

A.
B.

C.

D.

The Respondent requests that the Court adjudge and declare that:
The presence of Ravisian forces in Alicanto has been and continues to
be justified under international law;
The Court will decline to call upon Ravisia to produce its intelligence,
or in the alternative, decline to afford Alicanto any evidentiary benefit
should Ravisia continue to withhold the intelligence, and declare that
the Secretary-General may not deliver it to Alicanto;
The conduct of Ravisian troops at Camp Tara did not violate
international law, and that, in any event, Ravisia bears no liability for
any wrongdoing committed in the service of the UN, and that no
reparations are warranted; and
Piccardo Donati need not be delivered to Alicanto, where he will be
unlawfully executed.

